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Introduction
The present article reports evidence of national favouritism from professional referees in
two major sports: Rugby League and Rugby Union. National favouritism can appear
when a referee is in charge of a match where one team (and only one) is from his country.
For fear of the risk of such favouritism, such situations are avoided in most major sports.
In this study we study two specic competitions who depart from this\national neutrality"
rule: the European Super League in Rugby League (and its second tier competition) and
the Super 14 in Rugby Union. In both cases we nd strong evidence that referees favour
teams from their own nationality, in a way which has a large inuence on match results.
For these two major competitions, the Super League and the Super 14, we compare
how a team performs in situations where the referee both shares their nationality and in
situations where the referee comes from a dierent nationality. We also analyse referees'
decisions within matches (such as penalty and try decisions) in a Rugby League compe-
tition, the Championship (second tier below the Super League). In both Rugby League
and Rugby Union we nd strong evidence of national favouritism.
1 Research on referees' decision making processes
Referees' decisions often have to be made in very complex situations which may surpass
the limited cognitive abilities of the human brain (Salmela 1978). For example, in tennis
the visual perceptual system is limited in that is does not allow a dierentiation between
a ball on the line or one just outside it (Jendrusch 2002). In sports which have adopted
video refereeing this diculty is exemplied by the fact that video decisions may take
several minutes involving frame-by-frame footage from dierent angles. Whilst in the
1same situations without video footage, referees are expected to make decisions in split
seconds.
In addition to this intrinsic task diculty, referees have to make these decisions under
both high time pressure and high social pressure. The time pressure component comes
from the fact that referees are expected to make binding decisions in a very short amount
of time. Long decision times may signal uncertainty on the part of the referee and thus
undermine the credibility of the referee for the players and the spectators. The social
pressure component arises because decisions are usually made in front of partisan crowds
who judge and scutinise the referees' decisions. The crowd is usually unevenly distributed
with a higher proportion of supporters for the home team.
It is therefore to be expected that referees make mistakes. Numerous sports have
incorporated this fact into the design of their sports, going from the inclusion of video
refereeing to the possibility for teams or players to challenge referees' decisions (tennis,
cricket). On the contrary, other sports have been reluctant to adopt any measures which
could be seen as undermining the authority of the referee in the game. The most notable
case is football, which pays the price for this choice with recurrent blatant mistakes with
signicant consequences from the hand of Maradonna to the recent incident involving
Thierry Henry and Ireland.
Whilst it is to be expected, and perhaps tolerated, that referees may make some
mistakes, it is more important to detect if those mistakes tend to follow some systematic
pattern. It has been one of the foci of research studies on professional referees to detect
the systematic biases in their decision making processes. The most clearly identied bias
is the bias in favour of the home team. Previous research in football has found that
referees are more likely to favour the home team in their decision making concerning
fouls and cards (Dawson, Dobson, Goddard, and Wilson 2007), but also in the amount of
extra time allocated to the home team is higher when the home team is behind (allowing
it to catch up) than when it is ahead, (Dohmen 2008, Garicano, Palacios-Huerta, and
Prendergast 2005, Sutter and Kocher 2004). Several studies have shown that the home
team bias is largely induced by the home crowd (Boyko, Boyko, and Boyko 2007, Page
and Page 2009). The simple existence in a football stadium of a running track reduces the
proximity with the crowd and the home bias of the referee as well (Buraimo, Forrest, and
Simmons 2007, Scoppa 2008). The home advantage has also found to be referee specic
with some referees giving a large home advantage and others a smaller one. In addition,
the eect of the crowd on the home advantage depends on the referee's identity (Page
and Page 2009), with it increasing for some referees when the size of the crowd increases
while it stays roughly constant for other referees (who may be more resilient to social
pressure). A possible explanation is that referees use crowd noise as a clue about the
existence of a foul. Interestingly, Nevill, Balmer, and Williams (2002) found that referees
judging actions from video footage where much less likely to advantage the home team
when the sound was turned o than when it was turned on, which suggets that the crowd
2noise plays at least some part in this phenomenon.
Beyond the home advantage eect, the time pressure element may cause other type
of biases. A long decision making process or a continual request for touch judge advice
would undermine the referee's credibility. For this reason, referees make quick judgements
in uncertain situations without time to reect on all of the available information. It is
therefore possible that they use prior knowledge of teams and/or players to help make
their decisions (Plessner and Haar 2006). It has, for example, been shown that the
previous reputation of players inuences referees decisions in basketball (Lehman and
Reifman 1987), baseball (Rainey, Larsen, and Stephenson 1989) and football (Jones 2002).
Finally, one may wonder if referees may be inuenced in their decision making by
implicit preferences they may hold over the dierent competitors. Preferences are not di-
rectly observable, however in some situations the referee's identity may suggest a natural
default preference between two teams/competitors. This is particularly the case when the
referee shares the national/local identity of one of the teams/competitors. The question
of national/local favouritism from referees has attracted a signicant amount of atten-
tion from researchers. National favouritism has been found in numerous sports and, in
particular, in subjectively judged sports, with clear national favouritism found in gure
skating (Seltzer and Glass 1991, Whissell, Lyons, Wilkinson, and Whissell 1993, Camp-
bell and Galbraith 1996), gymnastics (Ansorge and Scheer 1988, Ste-Marie 1996), ski
jumping (Zitzewitz 2006), rhythmic gymnastics (Popovi c 2000) and synchronised div-
ing (Emerson, Seltzer, and Lin 2009). In all these sports, referees have been found to
be systematically advantaging competitors from their own countries. The eect of this
favouritism is signicant in these competitions given the importance of referees' decisions
on the nal rankings.
In other sports where the results depends less directly on referees' decisions, some
evidence has also been put forward about the existence of a national/local bias. A
study on Australian football found that referees were more likely to favour teams from
their own states in matches against a team from another state(Mohr and Larsen 1998).
In cricket, (Crowe and Middeldorp 1996) found that Australian referees seem to make
more leg before wicket (LBW) decisions in favour of the Australian teams in matches
played in Australia over the period 1977-19941. More recently a study on MuayThai
(Thai Kickboxing) (Myers, Balmer, Nevill, and Al-Nakeeb 2006) also found evidence of
national favouritism from the judges.
In major sports like football and rugby, no such favouritism has yet been found. The
study of such a topic is made dicult by the fact that these sports do not usually allow
referees to ociate in matches with one team from their own nationality. In this paper we
look at rugby competitions where referees' decisions are thought to have a rather limited
role in the nal results of the games (in that they are enforcing rules rather than judging a
performance). We studied club competitions where referees ociate with one team being
1They cannot eliminate other possible reasons beside favouritism to explain this pattern.
3from their own nationality. We nd a systematic national favouritism from referees, with
a strong impact on the result of the matches. We discuss at the end of the paper the
implications of these results for the major competitions in rugby and football. We also
discuss several solutions to limit the eect of this favouritism on such competitions.
2 Data
2.1 Data on Match Results
Our dataset contains information on match results from two competitions in two dierent
rugby codes. First, we have information from the European Super League, which is a
rugby league competition consisting primarily of British teams with one French team, in
the period from 2006 to 2009. Second, we have the results of the Super 14 for the 2009
season. This is a rugby union competition which consists of ve South African teams,
ve New Zealand teams, and four Australian teams in an international club competition.
In the observed period (2006 - 2009), these competitions have the following attributes:
 they contain teams of dierent nationalities;
 they have referees of dierent nationalities;
 and, most importantly for our analysis, they allow referees to ociate matches where
the team of their own nationality is opposed to a team from another nationality.
This last feature is quite rare in the sporting world. Most international sports compe-
titions specically avoid selecting a referee of the same nationality as one of the teams (i.e.
World Cup). A special feature of the aforementioned competitions is that they are club
(not country) competitions where, arguably, nationality may seem a less salient element
of the contest. They are also standard year-long competitions which are comparable with
national competitions in which the local origin of the referee is usually not of import.
These two features may provide a rationale for why, in these competitions, referees are
permitted to ociate matches of teams from their own nationality.
Prior to 2009 in the Super 14 competition referees did not ociate matches where there
was a conict of nationality. Specically, the referee was either of a dierent nationality
to both teams of the referee was the same nationality of both teams (i.e. English referee
with two English teams). The decision to allow referess to ociate games where only one
team is from there nationality and the other is from a dierent nationality appears in
2009.
In the case of the Super League the competition was strictly composed of English
teams in 2005, and when the French team was included it received the same\treatment"
as other teams with the referees being picked from the pool of usual referees. Interestingly,
over the period 2006-2009 the competition had referees of dierent nationalities with
4mainly English referees, some Australian referees and one French referee. This variation
in referees nationality was not present over the period 1996-1997 when a French team
was also included in the competition.
2.2 Data on Referees's Decisions
In addition to studying the outcomes of these matches we also collected information on
specic decisions from video footage taken from a lower league of rugby league (Cham-
pionship), which, since 2009, includes a French team as well. These matches have the
advantage not to have been broadcast on television (we discuss why this is interesting
later on). Our data includes actions from 11 matches (55% of the season of the French
team), totalising 220 actions. One match presents the interest of being refereed by a
French referee while all the others are refereed by an English referee
2.3 Empirical Strategy
An analysis of referee decision making involves several diculties. One of these is when
studying a possible slight in referees decisions, a natural problem is to dene what is
a \correct decision". While some match situations indicate obvious decisions, lots of
situations involve a margin of interpretation (which is even more so when one takes
into account that referees do not make decisions in slow motion replay). It is therefore
understandable that referees may make \mistakes", that is, make a decision contrary to
what would be suggested by a slow motion replay. It is also understandable that fans
who are prone to wishful thinking nd themselves disagreeing on numerous occasion with
the referee's decision, given the lack of clarity of the situation being judged.
To study referee's favouritism bias we will therefore use two kinds of strategies. First,
we look for control groups where the neutrality of the referees in the game is more evident.
Such control groups can be used to observe how the alleged non neutrality of the referee
impacts on the result of the game. In particular, we test if the non neutrality of the game
tends to aect the average results of the games2 Second, we model how a referee should
inuence the game if he has a preference for one team. This allows us to compare the
decision pattern of non neutral referees to the pattern they should adopt if they have a
preference for one team which inuences their decisions.
2Obviously it is possible that referees favour one team without this favouritism aecting signicantly
the nal result, but arguably such a situation would inconsequential.
53 Model
Suppose an agent is ociating in a match where he has a preference for one team (Team
A). The agent will aim to maximise the Probability of winning of Team A3.
In order to advantage Team A the referee can make biased decisions.
Denition 1. A biased decision is a decision which is dierent from the decision the
agent would have made in the same situation if he had no preference over the two teams
competing.
Several times during a match, decision situations (DS) occur. In a match, a DS is a
situation where a referee may make three type of choices: a decision in favour of team A,
a decision in favour of team B, or no decision. For simplicity, we will only consider here
that in each DS, the agent must make a decision between Team A and Team B. Each
DS is characterised by a level of ambiguity. Figure 1 shows a way to represent this idea.
Any situation is characterised by a level or ambiguity a 2 [0;1]. When the evidence is
weak the ambiguity is high, and at the limit, the decision could go either way. When the
evidence is more clearly in favour of one team, the ambiguity in the situation is lower.
When an unbiased referee observes a DS, the balance of evidence will determine which
team the decision should go for. If the referee favours Team A, he has the option to switch
some decisions he would have made for Team B to Team A. Referees are evaluated on the
accuracy of their decisions by their sporting body and by the spectators, so any biased
decisions have a cost. We will suppose that the cost of a biased decision is negatively
correlated with ambiguity such that the more ambiguous a situation is, the less costly it
is for the referee to make a biased decision, and the less ambiguous it is the more costly
it is to make a biased decision. The ambiguity is observed at each period, before making
the decision.
Let us call d a decision variable in a DS which takes the value 1 if the decision is
biased in favour of Team A, 0 if the decision is not biased, and -1 if the decision is biased
in favour of Team B. Let P be the probability of winning the match for Team A, and C




For simplicity we will consider that a match is decomposed into T periods and that
in each period one and only one DS occurs. During each period t a scoreline dierence
t is generated by the opposition between the two teams. For simplicity we will assume
that this score dierence is a continuous variable and that t ; N(;) with  is a
parameter of dierence in ability between the two teams.
3We do not need to assume here that this favouritism is conscious. Favouritism may well be partially
or fully unconscious. We discuss this point later in the discussion section
6Figure 1: Decision situations and ambiguity
Let  = T   t be the number of periods left to play. At any point in time the





At each period t, the agent can decide to make a biased decision in order to inuence
t+1. A biased decision increases the expectation of the score dierence for the current
period for Team A. We will assume that a biased decision has an eect d on the scoreline
dierence at the next period, such that: t+1(d) ; N( + d;) and as a consequence,
(d) ; N( + d;).
Calling F the nal scoreline at the end of the match, the unbiased probability4 of
victory for Team A at any point in time in the match is: P(F > 0) = P(t +  >





The winning probability taking into account the possibility of a biased choice at the
present period is therefore5
4The probability of the team winning if no manipulation has occurred or no bias is present.
5We purposely chose to assume here that the agent does not anticipate his possible biased decisions
later on and take the unbiased probability as the decision variable. A simple way to relax this hypothesis




Biased decisions have a cost c(d). We will rst assume that there is a direct cost 1 a
with a being the level of ambiguity of the DS. We will also assume that at the end of the
match, the referee has a preference for a small dierence in the number of decisions given
between the two teams, j
P
t dtj. The reason for this is that a large dierence could signal
favouritism. The agent will therefore prefer not to create too large a dierence between
the number of decisions given for one team and those given for the other team, over the
whole match. Let   be the unit cost of a dierence in the number of decisions at the end
of the match. At any point in time the total cost for all the decisions taken in the match
is: C =
P
t at;dt6=0     (j
P
t dtj).
The marginal cost of a biased decision is therefore:








The programme of the decision maker at a given period t is:
maxdt P(t;;dt)   ct(dt)
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Proposition 1 (Biased decisions). Assuming that the probability of team A and team B
to commit an oence or an error are similar, if a referee favours team A, the expected
number of decisions over a match in favour of team A will exceed the expected number of
decisions made for team B.
Proposition 1 is intuitive, though it can only a result on average as a biased decision
can only occur in so far as the level of ambiguity in a situation is high enough. It is
therefore well possible in some matches that even a referee with favouritism give a penalty
count against the favoured team because there were not enough ambiguous situations for
biased decisions to compensate obvious decisions.
Proposition 2 (Importance of Decisions). If the cost of dierent decisions can be con-
sidered constant, favouritism will induce more biased decisions for decision with a greater
impact on the nal result.
would be to assume that the agent expects an average level of bias during the rest of the game, this
could be entered in the model as aecting , with 0 >  being more in favour of Team A. An agent
foreseeing perfectly the future would anticipate that his future choices to bias decisions will be aected
by the future situations likely to be observed after his present choices.
8If the cost of more important decisions for the referee is lower than the additional gains
for Team A, critical decisions will tend to be more biased than less critical decisions.
Proposition 3 (Scoreline Dierence). When teams are close in ability, favouritism will
induce more biased decisions when the scoreline is close and when the favoured team is
just trailing.
Proposition 3 (proofs in the Appendix) is very intuitive, it shows that the action of a
referee is most likely to have an impact on the end result of the game when the biased
decision is taken when the scoreline is close. In addition, it shows that in a DS where a
biased decision is most likely to be taken are situations where Team A is slightly trailing
(by half the average eect of a referee decision). Intuitively, it is when a team is slightly
trailing that a biased decision will be the most helpful to help the team in a dicult
situation. If the team is slightly ahead it does not need as many biased decisions to win
the game eventually.
Proposition 4 (Scrutiny and Ambiguity of Decisions Situations). Favouritism will in-
duce more biased decisions when the ambiguity in the situation is larger.
This proposition is straightforward. The ambiguity can be seen not just as something
perceived by the referee, but how the referee perceives that other actors perceive the
ambiguity. For example, if a large screen is present in the stadium and replays in slow
motion the actions, for a given action, there will be less ambiguity for the spectators
about the best action to be taken, hence the cost of a biased decision will be higher.
Corollary 1. There will be less favouritism in DS facing a stronger scrutiny from the
audience like the matches broadcast on television: replays in the stadium on a large screen,
video refereeing decisions, replays and analyses of decision by television commentators.
Proposition 5 (Scrutiny on the Balance of Decisions). Favouritism will induce less biased
decisions when the balance of decision is the object of a stronger scrutiny with   being
higher.
This proposition is straightforward. When the cost of creating a unbalance in the
decision is higher, the favouritism will be lower.
Proposition 6 (Time Remaining in the Match).
i When the scoreline is close favouritism will induce more biased decision toward the
end of the match.
ii When the scoreline dierence is large, favouritism will induce less biased decision
toward the end of the match.
9Proposition 6 expresses the fact that the time left in the game aects the uncertainty
of the nal results. When the scoreline is close, if there is a signicant amount of time
left until the end of the game, the eect of a biased decision can be compensated by the
normal evolution of the scoreline afterward. On the contrary, when there is not much
time left in the match the eect of a biased decision may be even greater on the winning
probability as there will not be much time left for Team B to score again.
When the scoreline is not close, if there is a signicant amount of time left until the
end of the game, the evolution of the scoreline later on may allow Team A to eventually
win, and the biased decision would have been one of the elements contributing to this
victory. On the contrary, if there is not much time left, a biased decision will not have
any eect on the nal outcome as Team A will not have enough time to score again and
win the game.
Proposition 6 is very useful to identify favouritism because of a specic timing pattern
which is asymmetric for Team A and Team B.
Proposition 7 (Compensation). Favouritism will induce biased decisions for Team B
in order to limit the dierences in the number of decisions. Referees will compensate in
favour of Team B when the eect of the nal result is likely to be small.
If during the match biased decisions are taken at the critical moments identied by
Proposition 3, and 6, the balance of decisions will look uneven at the end of the game.
Biased decisions in favour of Team B can then be optimal in DS where they would have a
very low impact on the probability of Team B to win the match if they allow the referee
to even the balance of decisions.
Proposition 8 (Decisions Marginal Value). Favouritism will induce an asymmetry be-
tween the marginal value of referees' decisions:
i Biased decisions in favour of Team A on average produce more points for this team
than a fair decision for Team A.
ii Biased decisions in favour of Team A on average produce more points for this team
than decisions for Team B do for that team.
iii Dierences in the penalty count creates larger dierences in scores in matches with
biased decisions.
This conjecture is a simple consequence of the fact that decisions in favour of Team A
tend to be taken when their impact on the game tends to be the greatest while decisions
in favour of Team B tend to be taken when the impact on the game tend to be small. This
conjecture cannot be proven without any assumption on the distribution of the actual
scoreline during the match (a proof is given in the Appendix for a special case).
104 Results
4.1 Overall match results as a function of the referee's nation-
ality
Looking at the overall match results, we can compare how a team performs depending
on the neutrality of the referee. In the Super 14 Rugby, we can take the home team as a
reference and compare how they perform depending on the nationality of the referee. In
the European Super League, there is only one non British team, so in this case we use
this team as a reference and compare it's results as a function of the nationality of the
referee.
Figure 2 shows the average dierence in score in favour of the home team and the
winning probability of the home team for both of these situations. In both leagues, teams
perform better when the referee is neutral or from their own nationality. The result is
only signicant for the proportion of wins in Super League with the Super League winning
67% of their match with an Australian or French referee, but only 41% of their matches
with an English referee.
One may be worried that referees may be allocated to dierent kinds of game. For
instance, in Super League, if Australian referees were to have been allocated to matches
where the opposition to the French team is of lower quality, the comparison between
neutral and non neutral referees would give the impression that the French team is more
successful with a neutral referee. In Super 14 if the a referee from the nationality of the
opposition is allocated when home team meet stronger opposition, the nationality could
also hide a dierence in the quality of the teams.
To control for this possibility, we can focus on matches between comparable opposition.
In the Super 14, we restricted the sample to matches where the home team meets a team
whose nal dierence in ranks in the championship is not higher than 3. For the Super
League, we used the fact that we observe teams over several years to keep\xtures"(home
team-away team) where both neutral and non neutral referees have ociated.
It is noticeable that in both the Super 14 and the Super League, the\referee eect"is
stronger in the subsample of comparable matches. The dierences are now signicant for
the dierences in terms of wins and points in both the Super 14 and the Super League.
In both situations the increase in the magnitude of the dierences is actually due
to the fact that teams are more likely to play in a match with a referee having the
nationality of the opposite team when the opposition is weaker. That is why controlling
for the dierences in teams quality across matches reveals a larger eect of having a non
neutral referee.
To go beyond these descriptive statistics, we implement within estimators which look
at the the eect of the referee's non neutrality by comparing the results of the teams with
a neutral and non-neutral referee only within each set of comparable matches.
Table 1 shows the results of the statistical analyses. The variable\Referee proximity"
11Figure 2: Team results as a function of the referee's nationality, Super 14 and Super
League
12Figure 3: Team results as a function of the referee's nationality, Super 14 and Super
League - Subsample of comparable matches
13takes the value -1, 0 and 1 for the Super 14 sample to indicate respectively a referee
nationality identical to the opposition team, neutral and identical to the home team
observed dierences in Super League are signicant. In Super League, the French referee
and the Australian referees are merged in one category and the variable takes the value
0 if the referee is English and 1 if he is not English.
Table 1: Referees national favouritism, sample of similar matches
Super 14 Super League
FE Linear FE Logit FE Linear FE Logit
 points Win  points Win
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Referee proximity 5.29y 1.12 9.07y 1.27
( 1.99) ( 1.97) ( 1.72) ( 2.28)
Constant 5.59 -5.26
( 2.69) ( -1.88)
N 27 27 57 57
Robust t-stats and z-stats in parenthesis, signicant at y 10%,  5%,  1%
Table 1 shows that even with few observations when keeping only comparable matches,
and even when using a within estimator, the eect of the referee nationality is large and
statistically signicant in both competitions. In Super 14, a referee with the nationality
of the team increases the scoreline of the team by 5 points relative to neutrality. In Super
League, the French team received, on average, 9 points more in a match when the referee
is not English.
In the case of favouritism, Corollary 1 suggests that referees should inuence the
game less when it is broadcast on television. We collected the list of matches which were
broadcast live on English television for the Super League over the seasons 2006-2009.
Figure 4 shows the dierence of the French team results whether the game is broadcast
live on television or not. We only used comparable xtures, that is xtures which have
sometimes been on television and sometimes not. The dierence is surprisingly very
strong. When the referee is English, the French team is much more successful when the
match is on television (59%) than when it is not on television (30%).
Here again we can control for dierences between the xture quality using a xed
eect estimator. Table 2 shows these results.
14Figure 4: Results of the French team in Super League depending on broadcasting status
of the match, when the referee is English.
Table 2: French team results with English referees, eect of live broadcasting
Super League
FE Linear FE Logit
 points Win
(1) (2)
Live on TV 9.78y 1.84




Robust t-stats and z-stats in parenthesis,
signicant at y 10%,  5%,  1%
154.2 Referees' decisions within matches as a function of their
nationality
The rst section explored the impact of referee decisions on match outcomes. In this
section we explore in more depth within-match decisions in order to shed more light on
the specic nature of the favouritism bias. From the match records of the Super League,
we compare the number of penalties given to each team as a function of the nationality
of the referee. Figure 5 shows that English referees award signicantly more penalties to
the English team (P<0.01) while this is not the case for non-English referees (P=0.81).
Figure 5: Penalties awarded as a function of the referee's nationality
This information is however limited to penalties and does not take into account scrum
decisions. We analysed the video footage from 11 matches involving a French team in
the English Championship (second tier competition of the Super League).6. We nd that
English referees are more likely to make decisions (penalties and scrums) in favour of the
English team, as the rst two bars of Figure 6 show. In the only match with a French
referee, played in England, the proportion of decisions in favour of the English team (53%)
was much smaller than for matches played in England with English referees (59%).7
6These 11 matches represents 55% of their regular season. Interestingly, most video footage was
produced by the clubs, and only one of the matches was broadcast live on English television. As we
found that favouritism is more likely to be present in matches not broadcast live on television, these are
video footage of the situations where a favouritism is most likely to be seen.
7This comparison must however be taken with caution because it relies on only one match featuring
a French referee.
16Figure 6: Referees' decisions as a function of their nationality and of the location of the
match
4.2.1 Favouritism is particularly strong for critical decisions (Proposition 2)
Beyond the simple proportion of decisions in favour of each team, particular decisions are
more likely to go the way of the team from the referee's nationality when they are critical.
Figure 7 shows that for non-English referees there is little dierence with respect to the
number of cards given to the French and English teams8. On the contrary, in matches
where an English referee ociates, the French team receives more than twice the number
of cards of the English team. Relative to non-English referees, English referees penalise
the English team less and the French team more. The number of yellow cards given by
English referees is signicantly higher for the French team than for the English teams
(P=0.03).
Figure 8 shows that a similar pattern exists in the English Championship with the
French team receiving a higher amount of yellow cards than the English teams. Whilst we
do not have a control group with non English referees in the Championship, it is possible
to observe that compared with matches without any French team most of the dierence
comes from the fact that English teams are less likely to be sanctioned by yellow cards
when they play against a French team (P=0.057). A similar number of cards is given
to the French team and to an English team in all-English matches implying that poorer
discipline on the part of the French team is unlikely to be the cause of the observed
17Figure 7: Sanctions in Super League
Figure 8: Sanctions in Championship
18dierences.9
Interestingly, for the Championship we were also able to look at the critical decisions
to validate tries when the ball has been grounded. We found that the French team
received a lower proportion of positive decisions regarding try validation (79% vs 93%).
The dierence in proportion of tries validated is statistically signicant.
Figure 9: Proportion of tries validated
4.2.2 Favouritism is particularly strong when the scoreline is close (Propo-
sition 3)
In addition to the types of sanctions, the timing of the decisions also suggests national
favouritism. English referees are much more likely to make decisions in favour of the
English team when the score is close. Changes in scores are the most likely to impact
on the nal result when the game is close10. Therefore, the dierence observed in Figure
10 in the proportion of decisions taken by the English and French referees masks a more
fundamental dierence in their timing. In situations with close scorelines (0 to 4 points
dierence) the English referees only gave 58% of the decision in favour of the English team
versus only 43% for the French referee. Decisions by English referees favoured more the
8French teams get more red cards and less yellow cards. However, given the small number of occur-
rences no inference can be made from these numbers.
9Overall, the number of sanctions (penalties and cards) is actually lower in matches with a French
team than in matches between two English teams. This observation also points to the fact that the
dierence between French and English teams is not due to poorer discipline from the French team. It is
just the allocation of these sanctions which creates a dierence between the French and English teams.
10A decision one way or the other when the game is close may help a team to get ahead and possibly
build on this advantage. When there is a signicant dierence in scoreline a decision is not as likely to
have an impact on the nal result.
19English teams when it mattered the most, and symmetrically, decisions from the French
referee favoured more the French team when it mattered the most.
Figure 10: Timing of referees decisions
While there are few critical decisions, their timing is also paramount given their im-
portance. We nd that whens the scoreline is close the dierence between the proportion
of tries validated for the French team and for the English team increases such that the
French team has only a 59% chance to get a try validated versus 82% for the English
team11. Figure 11 shows that when the scoreline is close both teams have a lower try
validation which may be due to a higher diculty to score cleanly in a close contest.
However, the gap for the French team is much larger (22 percentage points) when the
scoreline is close than when it is not (14 percentage points).
11We did not include here the television match as the try validation is often referred to a video referee.
20Figure 11: Timing of critical decisions
4.2.3 Referees' decisions are more in favour of their national team when the
level of scrutiny is lower (Propositions 4 and 5)
The level of scrutiny for English referees should be minimal in matches in England which
are not broadcast on television. Figure 12 shows that it is in situations of greater scrutiny
that the timing of the decisions are the most asymmetric with 80% of the decisions going
the way of the English team when the scoreline is close. While this number is only based
on a very limited number of decisions (10 decisions only), it goes some way to explaining
the 27% proportion of wins for the French team in SL when the game is not broadcast
on television.
Finally, looking at the type of referees' decisions, it is possible to consider that the level
of scrutiny is not the same for every decisions. Penalties are recorded and often published
with the match results. On the contrary decisions to allocate the ball in scrums following
knock-ons or forward passes are not recorded. For this reason the referee has potentially
more discretion in these choices which face a lower level of scrutiny. Figure 13 shows
that indeed, English referees in the Championship make more decisions in favour of the
English team for scrum decisions than for penalty decisions (this dierence is however
not signicant).
21Figure 12: Timing of the decisions as a function of the location and broadcast status -
English referees only
Figure 13: Proportion of penalty and scrum decisions taken for each team
224.2.4 When the score is close favouritism induces more biased decisions when
there not much time left in the game. When the score is not close,
favouritism induces less biased decisions when there is not much time
left in the game (Propositions 6).
Figure 14 shows that when the scoreline is relatively close (12 points or less), the pro-
portion of decisions in favour of the French team is lower at the end of match. On the
contrary, when the scoreline dierence is relatively large, more decisions are made for
the French team at the end of the match. These dierences are large in absolute terms,
however they are not signicant due to a small sample size and should only be considered
as suggestive.
Figure 14: Decisions for the French team in the Championship as a function of the time
and of the scoreline - English referees
4.2.5 In case of favouritism the average number of points generated by a
decision for team A is larger than fair decisions (Proposition 8)
A simple way to test Proposition 8 is to see if on average the penalty count dierence
observed in matches with a non neutral referee creates a larger dierence in points than
in matches with a neutral referee. Table 3 presents the average marginal eect on the
23Super League Championship
ET vs ET 0.42 1.13
FT vs ET 1.96 1.71
Dierence 1.53 0.59
N 394 97
Signicant at: , 5%.
ET: English team, FT: French team.
Table 3: Marginal value in points of penalty decisions accross types of matches - English
referees
scoreline of penalty decisions. These marginal eects are computed by linear regression of
the nal scoreline dierence on the dierence in the penalty count. It shows that indeed,
when English referees ociate in a match with a French team, the average dierence
in points created by a given dierence in penalty count is larger than when the match
opposes two English teams. In Super League, a dierence of one penalty in favour of the
the English team produces on average 1.53 points more when it is a match with a French
team and an English referee. This dierence is statistically signicant (P=0.024). In the
Championship penalties also produce more points in the match with the French team
(this dierence is however not signicant).
5 Discussion
5.1 Summary of Findings
In the Super 14 competition (rugby union), the European Super League and the English
Championship (rugby league) our study nds that teams are much more successful when
the referee is from their own nationality. In the Super 14, the home team wins 71% of
its matches when the referee is from its own nationality and only 50% when the referee
is from the nationality of the away team. In the Super League, the French team wins
67% of its matches when the referee is not English (Australian or French) and only 41%
when the referee is English. However, these dierences fade when referees' decisions face
a higher level of scrutiny. In the Super League matches where the referee is English, the
French team is much more likely to win if the match is broadcast live on English television
(60%) than if it is not (37%).
Our analysis of referees' decisions within matches indicates that referees make more
decision in favour of the team of their own nationality and that, moreover, favouritism is
more discernible on most critical decisions like yellow and red cards and tries validation.
We also nd evidence of referees making decisions in favour of the teams of their own at
24the most critical times during the match (i.e. when the scoreline is close).
5.2 Conscious or unconscious biases?
A natural question arising from these results is how conscious/intentional these biases
are. It is beyond the scope of this paper to answer this question, however we should
stress here that this a dicult question to answer.
There are at least two arguments which can be put forward to defend that a least a
signicant part of these biases may be unintentional. First, referees' decisions are made
under intense time pressure because referees have to make decisions in split seconds.
Research on the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, Schwartz, et al. 1998,
McConnell and Leibold 2001) has found that for such quick decisions, implicit preferences
matter with individuals taking more time to make the right decision when it goes against
their implicit preference than when it reinforces it12. This could aect referees' decision
processes if they have a threshold in terms of decision time to make a decision. Given the
social pressure, referees may feel uncomfortable to make a decision one way or the other
after a given time threshold following an action/incident (for instance after 3 seconds).
Then, when a decision has to be made by a referee against a team for which he has implicit
preferences, the time required to make the decision may be too long and referees may be
more likely to be beyond the decision threshold in situations where the decision would go
against the team they support. Figure 15 shows such possibility with the distribution of
time the referee needs to make a decision in both cases. If the referee opts not to make
any decision over a given threshold and if decisions against a given team take more time
to be made, they will less likely to be made.
Research on cheating has also shown that the psychological border between the right
and wrong decision is fuzzy (Ariely 2008). Most decisions require an interpretation of the
rules to determine the best action to pursue. In most situations there is some ambiguity
about the perfect interpretation of the rule. This ambiguity typically allows the individual
to adopt self serving behaviours which he/she can rationalise as being in accordance with
the rules. It has for instance been found that cheating behaviours are much more likely
when there is potential ambiguity about the interpretation of the rules. Ambiguity is a
major element in situations referees have to judge. In their 2002 study, Nevill, Balmer,
and Williams (2002) proposed 47 football situations to a set of referees on video footage.
Non of them received a unanimous verdict from referees. This suggests that in team
sports like football, and certainly like rugby, there is a large margin of interpretation
for the referee. In numerous situations, the best decision to enforce the rules is not
straightforward13. In such ambiguous situations, the decisions may be systematically
12Implicit Association Test (IAT) is a test designed to measure implicit attitudes, that is attitudes
which are outside of the the individual's awareness.
13In rugby league for instance, it is often hard to visually determine if a ball has gone forward (knock
on, forward pass) or not (ball in play), it is hard to see if a ball has been stolen in a tackle (ball steal)
25Figure 15: Timing of decisions and favouritism
biased in favour of the individuals' preferences (here the referee), while in the mean time
the ambiguity oers enough room for them to rationalise their choices as being the right
ones. In such situations the individual may be able to stay convinced that he has been
following the right decision process while adopting a systematically lopsided decision
process.
Part of this national favouritism could naturally be coming from an intentional desire
to aect the result of the game14. Such a claim cannot be made or rejected from the data
we observe. Whilst it is of interest for anybody willing to assess the level of responsibility
(loosely dened) of the referees in this situation, it is however not our primary interest
here. The level of consciousness of referees' biased decision making process is certainly
an interesting psychological question. However, in a more economic approach (in both
senses of the term) we simply show here that referees' national preferences do matter and
that they impact signicantly on the results of the competition.
5.3 Implications
These results are important in the whole set of research on referees' decision making.
More practically they are important for sports competitions involving teams from dierent
countries in rugby and in other sports. They suggest that the referee's identity cannot
be ignored and that referees' preferences may well inuence the game.
or if the player lost it (knock on).
14Such intentional biases have for instance been found in situations of corruption (Distaso, Leonida,
Patti, and Navarra 2008). Such situations are, however, most likely to be rare.
26For the competition under investigation in this paper the existence of a favouritism
bias is problematic as it aects the fair outcome of the competition which is costly to both
the teams and supporters. Beyond this, the results could also aect the market value of
television rights for television channels from dierent countries because television channels
will typically provide a higher value to matches where the national team is more likely to
win. In the specic case of the Super League of Rugby the peculiar situation of a single
French team mainly refereed by English ocials suggests that favouritism bias may be a
major obstacle to the goal of expanding the game in France, which is ocially one of the
reasons for the inclusion of the French team in the rst place15.
Beyond these specic competitions our results suggest that national favouritism should
not be ignored in major professional sports. More subtle favouritism like the possible pref-
erences of referees over local teams in a national championship, or the possible preference
over teams from one's own continent16 in international matches, or even the strategic
preferences over a result in a game where the referee is neutral but where the result may
have a consequence on the referee's national team prospects17.
These results may also be considered as having more interest than just the identica-
tion of a national favouritism bias. A major element of our results is that the dierences
across referees are very large, a result which indeed surprised us. This suggest that ref-
erees have a in rugby a very large impact on the results. Whilst we can measure here
dierences between referees on some observable characteristics, we do not observe dier-
ences which could arise from their preferences/beliefs of the players, their susceptibility
to be inuenced by the crowd, their beliefs in the specic way to interpret certain rules,
or even their frame of mind on a given day including their expectation from the present
match18 This shows that the quest for a fair and accurate refereeing is a goal which is not
easy to achieve. Our results suggest that a sport like rugby under both its codes should
try to continue to look into new solutions to improve the refereeing process and overcome
its human limitations19.
15In the specic case of the Championship, a French team was included in this second tier competition
as a stepping stone to be included in the Super League. The nal inclusion is however conditional on a
high level of performance in this second tier. Our results show that the systematic bias suered by this
team may well be a major factor preventing this team to perform and therefore paradoxically making a
failure of this stepping stone strategy.
16When for instance a European referee is in charge an international game involving a European and
a non European team.
17In the 2009 Six Nations Tournament in Rugby Union, a Welsh referee notably allocated a penalty
count of 13 to 2 in favour of Ireland in a match Ireland versus France while France was at that stage
the main contender for the bookmakers alongside Wales. Whilst there is no evidence that the referee
was biased in his decision making process, such situations present clearly an interest as they may arise
in numerous competitions even if the matches with non neutral referees are avoided.
18This potential over importance of idiosyncratic referees performance over the match was voiced loudly
by the Saracens manager in 2010: \There is a problem and that is the game is determined by referees,
not by teams. Everybody wants to know why the game is dying maybe that is why." Brendan Venter.
19The choice by the National Rugby League to use two referees would deserve to be studied as it
27Finally, and possibly more importantly, this national favouritism in sport from profes-
sional referees is a result of a pure case of the eect of national preferences. Professional
referees have an important material interest to make the best decision possible (as their
career depends on it). On the contrary no material interest is associated with the allo-
cation of an advantage to the team of their country20. This national favouritism from
referees is therefore a unique situation where individuals can be observed to act purely for
national preferences. While national preferences have mostly been ignored in economic
models of individual behaviour, our results show without a doubt that national identity
does matter.
5.4 Solutions
First, the easiest solution to consider is to limit the number of potential contentious
situations. For instance, in cricket, as a result of concerns over leg by wicket decisions by
home referees, cricket authorities have suggested that each series is umpired by both a
home and a neutral umpire (Crowe and Middeldorp 1996). The introduction of the non
neutral referees in Super 14 in 2009 may be seen on the contrary as going in the wrong
direction. Similarly, the present absence of any Australian referees in Super League
mechanically reduces the number of matches with neutral referees..
Second, another easy solution is to make referees aware of this situation as a part of
their training. It is not clear how this may aect their decision making, but feedback
to referees regarding their biases has been found to reduce their bias in other disciplines
(Plessner and Haar 2006).
Third, a natural way to improve referees' decision making is to incorporate appropriate
incentives to make adequate decisions. The highest the private incentives are the lower the
inuence of the national preferences are likely to be. As Rickman and Witt (2008) have
shown, the home bias from referees signicantly reduced with professionalism as referees
performance got more closely monitored and used in their professional promotion. A
simple solution may therefore be to increase the monitoring of non neutral refereeing
to judge referees' performance. An increased monitoring of referees decision making in
non neutral matches would also be likely to decrease potential biases. This could be
done by having video refereeing at non neutral matches. Another possibility would be
to transfer part of the monitoring process to the clubs themselves who could challenge
referees decisions, if not during the game, like in tennis, possibly after the game. Clubs
could be given several opportunities to challenge referees decisions after one match and
to build a case based on video footage. These additional specic reviews would then be
added to the evaluation of referees over the years. Along these lines another possibility
could intuitively lead to a lessening of individual biases (while on the other hand new biases from mutual
inuence could arguably arise).
20It is reasonable to assume so.
28would be to introduce the challenge option in the game itself with teams being allowed
a limited number of challenges for some specic action. Decision would then be referred
to video ocials.
5.5 Using a fairness index as a screening tool
In order to help this additional screening, the model developed in the present paper
actually provide a way to measure an index of fairness of matches and referees which may
help sport organisation and clubs to identify which matches or referee needs additional
screening.
A simple use of previous analysis is to compare the results from some categories of
referees to some control group. For instance, from the same analysis used to compute
Table 1 results it is possible to measure individual eect for some referees. While this is
not possible for the Super 14 due a sample size too small. It is possible for the Super
League for a limited number of referees with enough observations. Table ... shows the
dierence in score for the French team between some English referees and a control group
composed uniquely of Australian referees. These numbers could be used as index of
fairness for each referees.
Such an approach is however not very ecient as it requires a lot of matches to make
meaningful comparisons. With 4 years of data our calculation are still quite imprecise
at the referee level due to the small number of matches for each referees. While the
dierences to the control group are quite large for most referees only one is statistically
signicant thanks to a number of matches large enough.
Another approach is to use the prediction of our model to identify matches and referees
where the pattern of decisions shows more favouritism. Let NA be the number of decisions
taken for team A and NB be the number of decisions taken for team B. Following
Referee Dierence t-stat Nb match N xtures
Ref 1 -34.66 -2.59 6 3
Ref 2 -33.22 -4.72 12 4
Ref 3 -12.94 -0.97 12 5
Ref 4 -5.52 -0.79 18 7
Ref 5 -1.67 -0.24 22 8
Ref 6 3.88 0.74 12 5
Signicant at  5%.
Table 4: Comparing referees individually to a control group (English SL referees vs
Australian referees on similar xtures)
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Both these measures are imperfect to measure favouritism but can be seen as a decision
tool to help identify the situations where more screening and review of decisions are
required. These index cannot be seen as perfect measures of the eect of favouritism
on match as only part of the consequence of favouritism are measured with these index.
Both index have by design some limitation: the D1 index (average dierence in the value
of decision) is useful it does not take into account the number of decisions, so it may
underestimate favouritism, the D2 index takes into account the number of decisions but
number of decision may well be due to the natural game itself and as a consequence it
may overestimate or underestimate favouritism. Table 5 shows the results of such an
estimations. The fairness index allows to identify three referees in our sample of 7 with a
fairness index signicantly dierent from neutrality. Interestingly this procedure requires
much less matches but information on decision within matches. The test of signicance
of the index identies situations where the timing of decisions has given an advantage to
a team beyond what should be expected from pure randomness. It should not be seen as
proving the favouritism of the concerned referees, but should be used as a way to screen
referees' performance and matches where referees decision may have been more atypical.
30Referee D1 D2 Nb of matches
Ref 1 3.25 107.20 1
Ref 2 2.56 71.79 1
Ref 3 2.26y 133.32y 2
Ref 4 1.52y 92.62y 2
Ref 5 0.22 15.58 2
Ref 6 -0.15 -5.59 1
Ref 7 -1.01 -34.21 1
Signicant at y 10%,  1%. Test by non parametric booststrap.
Positive numbers suggest favouritism toward English teams.
Table 5: Fairness index - timings of decision and impact on match outcome
6 Conclusion
This study has given for the rst evidence of referees' national favouritism in rugby does
exist and that this issue should not be ignored by sporting body. While we identify referee
favouritism in the clear situation of nationality dierences, it raise clearly the question of
favouritism when referees may come from the same region or city of a team in a national
league. In addition, favouritism could more subtle with referees having a preference on
the outcome of the game as in situations where a team A can benet from team B beating
team C. Such situations are common in round tournaments. In rugby, the Tri-nation and
Six-nation tournaments could be concerned by such an issue even if there is never a non
neutral refereeing.
We show in this paper that how the technique used to identify favouritism could be
used to measure a fairness index for matches and referees. Such an index could be a
tool for sporting federations to monitor more closely referees decisions when neutrality
may be questionable. This tool would increase the cost of biased decisions by revealing
atypical patterns in referees decisions. As such it would most likely reduce the degree
of favouritism by its simple existence. Such a tools could also be used by federation to
help identify match xing situations as those which have appeared recently in football in
Germany and Italy.
A Technical appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. The left expression in equation (1) reaches a maximum for  t 
 > 0, that is when the scoreline is close or when team A is slightly behind. Let consider










































Proof of Proposition 6. In the case of two teams with identical ability,  = 0. The























d;(t;;d) is of the sign of ( 22 + 2 + 2 + 2). That is 00
d;(t;;d) > 0 i
 <
(+)
 . Therefore, for  >    , 00
d;(t;;d) > 0. That is, for  large enough,
the marginal eect of the decision increases with the time left until the end of the game
(eg. it decreases over time). Reversely, for  <    , 00
d;(t;;d)d) < 0. That is,
for  small enough, the marginal eect of the decision decreases with the time left until
the end of the game (eg. it increases over time).












0, the agent makes a biased decision for team A if d > at   . When
Pt 1
t dt > 0, the
agent makes a biased decision for team A if d > at +  . A biased decision for team B
is however optimal if:     d > at.






> a +  



















Ansorge, C., and J. Scheer (1988): \International Bias Detected in Judging Gym-
nastic Competition at the 1984 Olympic Games.,"Research Quarterly for Exercise and
Sport, 59(2), 103{07.
Ariely, D. (2008): Predictably irrational: The hidden forces that shape our decisions.
HarperCollins London.
Boyko, R., A. Boyko, and M. Boyko (2007): \Referee bias contributes to home
advantage in English Premiership football," Journal of Sports Sciences, 25(11), 1185{
1194.
Buraimo, B., D. Forrest, and R. Simmons (2007): \The twelfth man? Referee-
ing bias in English and German soccer," Governance and Competition in Professional
Sports Leagues, p. 217.
Campbell, B., and J. Galbraith (1996): \Nonparametric tests of the unbiasedness
of Olympic gure-skating judgments," The Statistician, 45(4), 521{526.
Crowe, S., and J. Middeldorp (1996): \A comparison of leg before wicket rates
between Australians and their visiting teams for test cricket series played in Australia,
1977-94," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series D (The Statistician), 45(2),
255{262.
Dawson, P., S. Dobson, J. Goddard, and J. Wilson (2007): \Are football referees
really biased and inconsistent?: evidence on the incidence of disciplinary sanction in
the English Premier League,"Journal of the Royal Statistical Society-Series A, 170(1),
231{250.
Distaso, W., L. Leonida, D. Patti, and P. Navarra (2008): \Corruption and
Referee Bias in Football: the Case of Calciopoli," Working paper.
Dohmen, T. (2008): \The inuence of social forces: evidence from the behavior of
football referees," Economic Inquiry, 46(3), 411{424.
Emerson, J., M. Seltzer, and D. Lin (2009): \Assessing Judging Bias: An Example
From the 2000 Olympic Games," The American Statistician, 63(2), 124{131.
Garicano, L., I. Palacios-Huerta, and C. Prendergast (2005): \Favoritism
under social pressure," Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(2), 208{216.
Greenwald, A., D. McGhee, J. Schwartz, et al. (1998): \Measuring individual
dierences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test," Journal of personality
and social psychology, 74, 1464{1480.
33Jendrusch, G. (2002): \Probleme bei der Bewegungsbeobachtung und-beurteilung
durch Kampf-, Schieds-und Linienrichter," Psychologie und Sport, 9(4), 133{144.
Jones, P. (2002): \Erskine (2002) MV Jones, GC Paull and J. Erskine, The impact of
a team's reputation on the decisions of association football referees,"Journal of Sports
Sciences, 20, 991{1000.
Lehman, D., and A. Reifman (1987): \Spectator inuence on basketball ociating,"
The Journal of social psychology, 127(6), 673{675.
McConnell, A., and J. Leibold (2001): \Relations among the Implicit Association
Test, discriminatory behavior, and explicit measures of racial attitudes," Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 37(5), 435{442.
Mohr, P., and K. Larsen (1998): \Ingroup favoritism in umpiring decisions in Aus-
tralian football," Journal of Social Psychology, 138, 495{504.
Myers, T., N. Balmer, A. Nevill, and Y. Al-Nakeeb (2006): \Evidence of na-
tionalistic bias in MuayThai," Journal of Sports Science and Medicine.
Nevill, A., N. Balmer, and A. Williams (2002): \The inuence of crowd noise and
experience upon refereeing decisions in football,"Psychology of Sport & Exercise, 3(4),
261{272.
Page, K., and L. Page (2009): \Alone against the crowd: Individual dierences in
referees' ability to cope under pressure," Journal of Economic Psychology.
Plessner, H., and T. Haar (2006): \Sports performance judgments from a social
cognitive perspective," Psychology of Sport & Exercise, 7(6), 555{575.
Popovi c, R. (2000): \International bias detected in judging rhythmic gymnastics com-
petition at Sydney-2000 Olympic Games," Physical Education and Sport, 1(7), 1{3.
Rainey, D., J. Larsen, and A. Stephenson (1989): \The eects of a pitcher's
reputation on umpires' calls of balls and strikes," Journal of Sport Behavior, 12, 139{
150.
Rickman, N., and R. Witt (2008): \Favoritism and Financial Incentives: A Natural
Experiment," Economica, 75(298), 296{309.
Salmela, J. (1978): \Gymnastics judging: A complex information processing task, or
(who's putting one over on who?) Part 1," International Gymnast, 20, 54{56.
Scoppa, V. (2008): \Are subjective evaluations biased by social factors or connections?
An econometric analysis of soccer referee decisions,"Empirical Economics, 35(1), 123{
140.
34Seltzer, R., and W. Glass (1991): \International politics and judging in Olympic
skating events: 1968{1988," Journal of Sport Behavior, 14, 189{200.
Ste-Marie, D. (1996): \International Bias in Gymnastic Judging: Conscious or Uncon-
scious Inuences?," Perceptual and motor skills, 83(3), 963{975.
Sutter, M., and M. Kocher (2004): \Favoritism of agents{The case of referees' home
bias," Journal of Economic Psychology, 25(4), 461{469.
Whissell, R., S. Lyons, D. Wilkinson, and C. Whissell (1993): \National bias
in judgments of Olympic-level skating," Perceptual and motor skills, 77(2), 355{358.
Zitzewitz, E. (2006): \Nationalism in winter sports judging and its lessons for orga-



























































































No. 41   (Download full text)  
Adam Clements, Mark Doolan, Stan Hurn and Ralf Becker  
On the efficacy of techniques for evaluating multivariate volatility forecasts  
 
No. 40   (Download full text)  
Lawrence M. Kahn  
The Economics of Discrimination: Evidence from Basketball  
 
No. 39   (Download full text)  
Don Harding and Adrian Pagan  
An Econometric Analysis of Some Models for Constructed Binary Time Series  
 
  No. 38   (Download full text)  
Richard Dennis  
Timeless Perspective Policymaking: When is Discretion Superior?  
 
No. 37   (Download full text)  
Paul Frijters, Amy Y.C. Liu and Xin Meng  
Are optimistic expectations keeping the Chinese happy?  
 
No. 36   (Download full text)  
Benno Torgler, Markus Schaffner, Bruno S. Frey, Sascha L. Schmidt and Uwe Dulleck  
Inequality Aversion and Performance in and on the Field  
 
No. 35   (Download full text)  
T M Christensen, A. S. Hurn and K A Lindsay  
Discrete time‐series models when counts are unobservable  
 
No. 34   (Download full text)  
Adam Clements, A S Hurn and K A Lindsay  
Developing analytical distributions for temperature indices for the purposes of pricing 
temperature‐based weather derivatives  
 
No. 33   (Download full text)  
Adam Clements, A S Hurn and K A Lindsay  
Estimating the Payoffs of Temperature‐based Weather Derivatives  
 
No. 32   (Download full text)  
T M Christensen, A S Hurn and K A Lindsay  
The Devil is in the Detail: Hints for Practical Optimisation  
 
No. 31   (Download full text)  
Uwe Dulleck, Franz Hackl, Bernhard Weiss and Rudolf Winter‐Ebmer  
Buying Online: Sequential Decision Making by Shopbot Visitors  
 
No. 30   (Download full text)  
Richard Dennis  
Model Uncertainty and Monetary Policy  
 
No. 29   (Download full text)  
Richard Dennis  
The Frequency of Price Adjustment and New Keynesian Business Cycle Dynamics  
 
No. 28   (Download full text)  
Paul Frijters and Aydogan Ulker  
Robustness in Health Research: Do differences in health measures, techniques, and time 
frame matter?  
 
No. 27   (Download full text)  
Paul Frijters, David W. Johnston, Manisha Shah and Michael A. Shields  
Early Child Development and Maternal Labor Force Participation: Using Handedness as an 
Instrument  
 
  No. 26   (Download full text)  
Paul Frijters and Tony Beatton  
The mystery of the U‐shaped relationship between happiness and age.  
 
No. 25   (Download full text)  
T M Christensen, A S Hurn and K A Lindsay  
It never rains but it pours: Modelling the persistence of spikes in electricity prices  
 
No. 24   (Download full text)  
Ralf Becker, Adam Clements and Andrew McClelland  
The Jump component of S&P 500 volatility and the VIX index  
 
No. 23   (Download full text)  
A. S. Hurn and V.Pavlov  
Momentum in Australian Stock Returns: An Update  
 
No. 22   (Download full text)  
Mardi Dungey, George Milunovich and Susan Thorp  
Unobservable Shocks as Carriers of Contagion: A Dynamic Analysis Using Identified 
Structural GARCH  
 
No. 21   (Download full text) (forthcoming) 
Mardi Dungey and Adrian Pagan  
Extending an SVAR Model of the Australian Economy  
 
No. 20   (Download full text)  
Benno Torgler, Nemanja Antic and Uwe Dulleck  
Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, who is the Happiest of Them All?  
 
No. 19   (Download full text)  
Justina AV Fischer and Benno Torgler  
Social Capital And Relative Income Concerns: Evidence From 26 Countries  
 
No. 18   (Download full text)  
Ralf Becker and Adam Clements  
Forecasting stock market volatility conditional on macroeconomic conditions.  
 
No. 17   (Download full text)  
Ralf Becker and Adam Clements  
Are combination forecasts of S&P 500 volatility statistically superior?  
 
No. 16   (Download full text)  
Uwe Dulleck and Neil Foster  
Imported Equipment, Human Capital and Economic Growth in Developing Countries  
 
No. 15   (Download full text)  
Ralf Becker, Adam Clements and James Curchin  
Does implied volatility reflect a wider information set than econometric forecasts?  
 
  No. 14   (Download full text)  
Renee Fry and Adrian Pagan  
Some Issues in Using Sign Restrictions for Identifying Structural VARs  
 
No. 13   (Download full text)  
Adrian Pagan  
Weak Instruments: A Guide to the Literature  
 
No. 12   (Download full text)  
Ronald G. Cummings, Jorge Martinez‐Vazquez, Michael McKee and Benno Torgler  
Effects of Tax Morale on Tax Compliance: Experimental and Survey Evidence  
 
No. 11   (Download full text)  
Benno Torgler, Sascha L. Schmidt and Bruno S. Frey  
The Power of Positional Concerns: A Panel Analysis  
 
No. 10   (Download full text)  
Ralf Becker, Stan Hurn and Vlad Pavlov  
Modelling Spikes in Electricity Prices  
 
No. 9   (Download full text)  
A. Hurn, J. Jeisman and K. Lindsay  
Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Improved Estimation of the Parameters of Stochastic 
Differential Equations by Numerical Solution of the Fokker‐Planck Equation  
 
No. 8   (Download full text)  
Stan Hurn and Ralf Becker  
Testing for nonlinearity in mean in the presence of heteroskedasticity.  
 
No. 7   (Download full text) (published) 
Adrian Pagan and Hashem Pesaran  
On Econometric Analysis of Structural Systems with Permanent and Transitory Shocks and 
Exogenous Variables.  
 
No. 6   (Download full text) (published) 
Martin Fukac and Adrian Pagan  
Limited Information Estimation and Evaluation of DSGE Models.  
 
No. 5   (Download full text)  
Andrew E. Clark, Paul Frijters and Michael A. Shields  
Income and Happiness: Evidence, Explanations and Economic Implications.  
 
No. 4   (Download full text)  
Louis J. Maccini and Adrian Pagan  
Inventories, Fluctuations and Business Cycles.  
 
No. 3   (Download full text)  
Adam Clements, Stan Hurn and Scott White  
Estimating Stochastic Volatility Models Using a Discrete Non‐linear Filter.   
 
  No. 2   (Download full text)  
Stan Hurn, J.Jeisman and K.A. Lindsay  
Seeing the Wood for the Trees: A Critical Evaluation of Methods to Estimate the 
Parameters of Stochastic Differential Equations.  
 
No. 1   (Download full text)  
Adrian Pagan and Don Harding  
The Econometric Analysis of Constructed Binary Time Series.  
 
 